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Abstract
This study investigated the influence of Corporate governance on the timeliness 
of financial reports of listed banks in Nigeria. In order to provide answers to the 
research questions raised in this study, data were generated from the annual report 
of the listed banks on the Nigerian Stock Exchange considering the period 2008–
2015. The study used Board size, Board Independence and Foreign Executives on 
the board as proxies for corporate governance. The data were analyzed using de-
scriptive statistics, correlation matrix and panel data regression analysis. It was 
observed that board size had a non-significant negative relationship with the 
timeliness of financial reports. Also, the study observed that board independence 
also had a non-significant negative relationship with the timeliness of financial 
reports. Finally, it was observed that foreign executives on the board had a signifi-
cant positive relationship with the timeliness of financial reports. The study thus 
recommends that the existing legal framework in Nigeria should be developed 
that clearly specifies the rights and obligations of a bank, its management and, of 
course, other stakeholders.
Uwalomwa Uwuigbe (Nigeria), Eluyela Damilola Felix (Nigeria),  
Olubukola Ranti Uwuigbe (Nigeria), Obarakpo Teddy (Nigeria), Falola Irene (Nigeria)
BUSINESS PERSPECTIVES
LLC “СPС “Business Perspectives” 
Hryhorii Skovoroda lane, 10, Sumy, 
40022, Ukraine
www.businessperspectives.org
Corporate governance 
and quality of financial 
statements: a study  
of listed Nigerian banks
Received on: 12th of March, 2018
Accepted on: 12th of June, 2018
INTRODUCTION
Financial reporting is no longer perceived or seen as a mere re-
cording of transactions or an ordinary bookkeeping activity. It is 
now seen as a crucial tool in managing a company under good cor-
porate governance principles (Uwuigbe et al., 2017). Financial re-
ports according to Nassar, Uwuigbe, Uwuigbe, and Abuwa (2014), 
can be described as a systematic description of the financial per-
formance and position of any entity; it actually provides informa-
tion about the entity to a comprehensive range of users in order to 
make quality economic and financial decisions. According to IAS 
1, “Financial reports present the performance of management as 
stewards of resources trusted to them”. This concept has received 
significant interest from present and potential investors as well as 
other major stakeholders (Okereke, 2008). The main objectives of 
preparing financial statements are to enhance the quality of the 
decisions made by the users, however, users can only make quali-
ty decisions with the availability of quality financial information 
(Uwuigbe et al., 2016). According to Sloan (2001), the quality of 
financial information is still a key cause of worry for all current 
and potential investors. Consequently, for financial information to 
be of quality, financial reports should get to the users in a timely 
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manner to enhance the effective use of such information (Alexander & Britton, 2000). In the same 
vein, Lewis and Pendril, (1996) and Mainoma, (2002) opined that in order to actualize the objec-
tives of the preparation of financial statements, financial information must be made available to 
the users in a timely manner to serve as an effective aid to the quality decision. Hence, there is 
a consensus that timeliness is an essential qualitative characteristic of quality financial reports 
(Belkaoui, 2002). It remains a noteworthy mechanism in reducing rumours, leaks and insider trad-
ing in emerging capital markets (Owosu-Ansah, 2000).
Business operations are fast becoming more complex. So also, is the growth of the investment 
community on the rise, and investors are making great demand for more timely and relevant in-
formation. The concept of timeliness in financial reports has been widely dealt with by accounting 
bodies, regulatory bodies, authorities and organizations globally. For example, the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), the U.S Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Nigerian Security 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), have all laid down certain requirements regarding the timing of 
published financial reports (Abdelsalam & Street, 2007). 
Corporate governance and financial reporting are highly interwoven. In fact, financial reporting 
forms a crucial part of the corporate governance mechanism (Melis, 2004; Melis & Carta, 2010). 
Similarly, the responsibility for appropriate and timely financial reporting rests on the shoulder 
of the apex governing body of a firm “the board of directors”. Furthermore, the foremost aim of 
financial reporting activity is to make available high-quality information; while corporate govern-
ance as part of it objective, provides a platform to ensure the quality of financial reports published. 
In recent times, corporate governance has come to be a matter of great concern in the corporate 
world because of the increasing high-profile scandals and crash of some companies like Lehman 
Brothers, WorldCom Enron in the United States, Parmalat in Italy, Marconi in Britain, Nortel in 
Canada, One Tel in Australia, the Volkswagen Emissions Scandal, the FIFA Corruption Scandal, 
Toshiba Accounting Scandal and so many other recent accounting based scandals (Uwuigbe et al., 
2017). These happenings in the global financial world dealt a big blow to investor confidence and 
assurance on the quality of financial information provided by management. The failures of these 
large organizations have led to the implementation of measures to the improvement of corporate 
governance mechanisms and a more intense interest in financial reports by stakeholders.
In Nigeria, the banking sector is highly regulated because of the past incidence of poor corporate 
governance, poor risk management policies, inadequate internal control systems and poor quali-
ty of financial reporting, hence, making it susceptible to scandals and failure. In order to address 
this problem, this led to the implementation of corporate governance regulations as an antidote. 
According to Arabsalehi and Ziaee (2010), the code of corporate governance in Nigeria in 2003, 
is regarded as the standard in the corporate society in Nigeria. The link between corporate gov-
ernance and quality of financial reports has been intensely discussed in developed context, with 
scarce evidence from emerging economies (Klai & Omri, 2011) consequently, there is no conclusive 
evidence of the inf luence of corporate governance on the quality of financial reports as proxy by 
timelines of financial reporting for emerging economies. Furthermore, a study into the timeliness 
of financial reports would be of great importance on the way to improving investors’ confidence 
and decreasing the tailbacks related with financial reporting in Nigeria. Hence, this study aims to 
examine the inf luence of corporate governance mechanisms on the quality of financial reports in 
Nigeria. It will attempt to determine the extent, to which board size affects the quality of financial 
reports. More so, it will examine the association between board independence and reliability of 
financial statements. Finally, it will examine the relationship between the foreign board executives 
and quality of financial reports. The residual part of this paper consists of the following sections; 
literature review and hypotheses development, methodology, discussions and findings, conclusion 
and recommendation.
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1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT
1.1. Theoretical framework
This study adopts the agency theory as a frame-
work for this research because it gives insight in-
to the agent behavior and the agent-principal re-
lationship. Management (agent) in playing their 
role of disclosing financial information to the 
shareholders (owners) and other stakeholders may 
give misleading information mainly due to their 
selfish gains. The issue of corporate governance 
arose from the activities of managers or agents 
in sharp practices, which usually are not in the 
principals (owners of the business) interest. Over 
time, situations have risen where the directors do 
not take action in shareholders’ best interest. This 
problem forms the core issue which agency theo-
ry addresses. This problem arises because of the 
disassociation of the control of a firm from own-
ership of such firm, hence the directors control the 
firm while the shareholders are the owners. This 
arrangement invariably gives birth to a conflict 
of interest amongst ownership (shareholders) and 
control (directors). This conflict of interest is the 
foremost problem that the principle of corporate 
governance intends to address. Companies should, 
therefore, seek to limit this principal-agent prob-
lem through a solid and effective corporate gov-
ernance policy. Corporate governance through 
the corporate governance mechanisms can be 
used to check and monitor the activities and oper-
ations of the agent, thereby ensuring that they are 
in line with the principals’ interests. This enables 
the owners to overcome the issues of lack of cred-
ible information. This study focused on corporate 
governance mechanisms like board size, own-
ership structure, board independence, Foreign 
Expatriates on the Board, and their various effects 
on the timeliness of financial reports.
1.2. Concept of corporate 
governance
Corporate governance remains a key concept that 
has enjoyed a great deal of public interest, this is 
due to the economic and financial implication it 
has for the well-being of companies and the so-
ciety in general (Solabomi & Uwuigbe, 2013; 
Uwuigbe, Daramola, & Anjolaoluwa, 2014). The 
World Bank report (2002) described the concept of 
corporate governance as “the set of rules that in-
fluence expectations about the use of control over 
resources of a firm”. Sloan (2002) opined that the 
first source of true and independent financial in-
formation about a firm’s performance is through 
its financial reports; this importance makes finan-
cial reporting a focal point of attraction to man-
agers as well as the rest key stakeholders. Basically, 
corporate governance ensures that shareholders, 
managers and other key stakeholders in an or-
ganization discharge their responsibilities with-
in the framework of transparency, accountabili-
ty, and ethics. According to Kachouri, Ben Saad, 
and Jarboui (2015), the board of directors is the 
key control mechanism of any organization. Prior 
studies (Singh, Mathur, & Gleason, 2004; Yermack, 
1996) have come to the conclusion that the struc-
ture of the board of directors have an influence on 
the timely financial reports. 
1.3. Board size and quality  
of financial reports
Patrick, Paulinus, and Mympha (2015) empha-
sized that corporate governance mechanisms like 
the firm size and board size have a strong impact 
on the timeliness of financial reports. From the 
perspective of agency theory, it can be argued 
that agency problems are easier tackled by larger 
boards because of the presence of greater number 
of people evaluating and observing management 
decisions (Bugshan, 2005). Monks and Minnow 
(1995) in a related study proved that larger boards 
have the capability to commit more time and effort 
in managing the company’s activities, while small-
er boards commit less effort and time in oversee-
ing the activities of the management. Klein (2002) 
shared a similar view on this topic by proposing 
that board monitoring is done more effectively by 
larger boards due to the inherent ability to share 
the responsibility amidst a larger sum of people. 
Yu (2008) acknowledged that larger boards have 
a strong relationship with lesser levels of earnings 
management. Yermack (1996) and Byard, Li, and 
Weintrop (2006) argued large boards confirm the 
value relevance of financial reports. Ezat and El-
Masry (2008) opined that the variability of the 
board’s membership together with their desire to 
15
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reveal more timely financial information will at-
tract the interest of more investors. This suggests 
that the larger the board, the greater the desire for 
more timely disclosures. In contrast to these find-
ings, Jensen (1993), Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg, 
Sundgren, and Wells (1998) all found out that an 
“overcrowded” or “large” boards are most likely 
to be ineffective in carrying out its oversight fic-
tion over a firm. What is “overcrowded” is, how-
ever, relative. According to Jensen (1993), smaller 
boards are most likely to give room for efficient 
and effective communication and coordination 
between the board and the management. Similarly, 
Vafeas (2000), Bradbury, Mak, and Tan (2006), and 
Ahmed, Hosain, and Adams (2006) were all of the 
opinion that large boards deplete the information 
content and increases the earnings management. 
Nevertheless, other did not confirm this link 
(Firth, Fung, & Rui, 2007). Therefore, based on the 
gap in the literature, this study predicts that:
H01: Board size does not significantly affect the 
quality of financial reports.
1.4. Board independence and quality 
of financial reports
In corporate governance literature, independent 
directors are usually proxies for board independ-
ence. An independent director is one that is free 
from the control of the Chief Executive Officer 
(Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 2000). Peasnell et al. 
(2000) and Klein (2002) observed that earnings 
management is usually mitigated by an independ-
ent board, which in the long run improves the 
timeliness of financial reports. In Britain, Beeks, 
Pope, and Young (2004) found out that board 
independence allows dissemination of time-
ly financial information by UK firms. Similarly, 
Canavan, Jones, and Potter (2004) opined that 
an independent board advances the quality of fi-
nancial reports of Chinese firms; Peasnell et al. 
(2000) and Davidson, Godwin, and Kent, (2005) 
have confirmed a strong link between of board 
independence and the quality of financial reports. 
Firth et al. (2007) opined that an independent 
board advances the quality the financial reports. 
Dimitropoulous and Asteriou (2010) and Marra, 
Marzzola, and Prencipe (2011) asserted that the 
independence of the board has a significant pos-
itive relationship with the timeliness of financial 
reporting. Kantudu and Samaila (2015) affirmed 
that a more independent board produces more 
timely financial information. Joseph and Ahmed 
(2017), in their work on the effects of corporate 
governance on the timeliness of financial reports 
in Nigeria, affirmed that board independence has 
a significant positive effect on the timeliness of fi-
nancial reports. 
However other studies provided a contrasting 
opinion on the aforementioned argument. Jaggi, 
Leung, and Gul (2007) observed that a strong neg-
ative relationship exists between the timeliness of 
financial information and a higher fraction of in-
dependent directors. Oba (2014) opined that board 
independence has a significantly negative effect 
on the quality of financial reports, which in other 
words means that the existence of more independ-
ent directors does not guarantee the timeliness of 
financial reports. Gulzar and Wang (2011), howev-
er, did not find any sort of pragmatic proof on the 
relationship between quality of financial reports 
and board independence. Other studies such as 
Ahmed, Hossain, and Adams (2006), Bradbury, 
Mak, and Tan (2006), and Petra (2007) have ar-
gued that independent directors do not have 
enough power to control managers and as such do 
not have any influence on the timeliness of finan-
cial reports. Furthermore, Petra (2007) observed 
that independent directors are sufficient mecha-
nisms to control and influence managers, but their 
incidence on the board may have no impact on 
the quality of information. The finding of Ho and 
Wong (2001) support Petra’s (2007) observations. 
Thus, based on the inconclusive results, this study 
postulates that:
H02: Board independence does not significantly af-
fect the quality of financial reports.
1.5. Foreign directors and quality  
of financial reports
The appointment of foreign directors is current-
ly a trend in most companies across the corporate 
world (Maryam, Michael, Steve, & Shane, 2016). 
This group of directors are unique because of their 
connections with another country, which may give 
room for adding new knowledge and expertise to 
the board. Nevertheless, they could be quite expen-
sive because of the cost attributed to presence of the 
16
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travelling expenses, distance and their non-famili-
arity with the nation of the firm where they are di-
rectors (Miletkov, 2013). Although the importance 
of their presence on the board clearly understood, 
the expertise of the foreign directors on the board 
is usually the best in monitoring the timeliness of fi-
nancial reports. Furthermore, Park and Shim (2003) 
observed a positive sort of link between the presence 
of foreign expatriates on the board and the timeli-
ness of financial reports. In contrast, Abdul and 
Mohamhed (2006) in their research revealed a neg-
ative relationship between the presence of foreign 
expatriates on the board and the quality of financial 
reports. Bedrad, Chotorou, and Courteau (2003) in 
their study of British firms opined that foreign expa-
triate on the board (FEB) has no sort of relationship 
with the quality of financial reports; Dimitropoulos 
and Asteriou (2010) established this claim.
H03: Foreign executives on board do not signifi-
cantly affect the quality of financial reports.
2. MATERIAL AND METHODS 
In order to successfully analyze the link between 
corporate governance and quality of financial in-
formation on Nigerian banks, the study adopted 
the panel data regression analysis technique. Panel 
data, according to Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2000), 
is the “repeated observation on the same cross-sec-
tion, typically of individual variables that are ob-
served for several time periods”. Hence, this study 
adopts this method due to the fact that the data 
gathered were both time-series and cross-sectional 
data. Judgmental sampling technique was adopt-
ed in the selection of the sample. It also adopts the 
use of secondary data for the period 2008 to 2015 
for 15 sampled banks listed on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange (NSE). The sampled listed banks were 
used as a measure of the effects of corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms on the quality of financial in-
formation, because their financial information was 
relatively more easily assessable available. 
2.1. Accounting quality (TIME)
Different authors have been defined Accounting 
quality differently; nevertheless, in this research 
work, it has been defined in terms of ‘timeli-
ness’. According to Uwuigbe et al. (2016), timeli-
ness of financial information has been described 
as a qualitative trait of financial reports; this is 
because it has the capacity to materially affect 
the decisions of the users. According to McGee 
(1998), timeliness of financial reporting is the 
time it takes to disclose the financial information 
to the members of the public. Consequently, it is 
measured by the natural logarithm of a number 
of days between year-end and the signature of 
the auditors’ report after year-end. In the context 
of this research, this study used quality of finan-
cial reporting, timeliness and accounting quality 
interchangeably. Hence, the longer the time, the 
less the accounting quality and vice versa. 
2.2. Model specification
Various corporate governance variables have 
been used in previous studies (Klein, 2002; 
Kajola, 2008; Love, 2011). These variables are 
Board Size (BSIZE), Board Chair/Chief Executive 
Status (CEOSTATUS) and Audit Committee 
(AUDCOM). However, this study adopted a rela-
tively new proxy for measuring corporate govern-
ance which was excluded in previous studies. This 
is Foreign expatriate on the board (FEB). In order 
to determine the effect of corporate governance on 
the quality of financial report in the banking sec-
tor, a linear regression model equation was used. 
The two constructs involved in this study are cor-
porate governance and quality of the financial re-
port. The regression equation can be expressed as:
0
.it itY xβ β µ= + +  (1)
Equation (1) can be defined as:
( ) .IS f CG cµ= +  (2)
“Demonstrating equation two (2) with the varia-
bles of the model, therefore, the equation below 
is formed with the presence of a control variable 
(size of the firm)”. Therefore, the equation becomes
(
)
 ;   ;
 ;
   .
FRQ f
Ownership structure
fore
Board size Director Independenc
ign expatriates on bo
e
ard
=
 (3)
The above can be deducted to the model below 
with the inclusion of a control variable, which is 
the size of the firm. 
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1 1
1
 .
t t
t
FRQ BDS BIND
FEB Board Size
− −
−
= + +
+ +  (4)
Therefore, the regression equation is:
0 1 1
2 1 3 1
,
t
t t
FRQ BDS
BIND FEB
β β
β β µ
−
− −
= + +
+ + +  (5)
where FRQ – quality of financial report, BDS  – 
board size. This captures the numbers of board 
members in the bank. BIND  – director independ-
ence. This is obtained from the ratio of total num-
ber of independent. directors on the Committee 
divided by the total number of directors. FEB  
– foreign expatriates on the board. This captures 
the proportion of total foreign expatriates on the 
board divided by board size. Control variable (which 
captures the natural log of total asset). β  – coef-
ficient of parameter, it  – time coefficient, this 
is the time frame being considered in the study, 
µ  – error term.
3. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
Table 1 shows the result of descriptive figures for 
all variables used in the study. Findings from the 
descriptive summary as depicted in Table 1 present 
a mean of 1.65, a maximum and minimum values 
of 1.98 and 1.20, respectively, for the quality of fi-
nancial report (FRQ). This suggests that averagely, 
banks listed on the floor of the NSE publish their 
financial statements late. Also, the mean value for 
board size (BDS) as depicted in Table 1 was 15. This 
invariably suggests that on the average, boards for 
most of the quoted banks in Nigeria are made up 
of 15 members. In addition, results from the de-
scriptive statistics present a mean distribution of 
54%, with maximum and minimum values of 0.81 
and 0.30 for board independence (BIND). This in-
dicates that the board independence status for the 
selected banks stood at 54%, which implies that, 
there is a higher fraction of independent directors 
than executive directors on the board. Foreign ex-
patriates on the board (FEB) maintained a mean 
stat of 0.93 with maximum and minimum stat of 
5 and 0, respectively. The outcome invariably im-
plies that the mean value of foreign expatriates on 
the board is very low suggesting the absence of 
foreign executives on the boards of most Nigerian 
banks. From the analysis, it can be seen that the 
standard deviation values are close to zero mean-
ing the mean values are reliable and there is very 
little volatility in the sample
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of variables
Source: Authors’ computation (2017) using Eview 8.0.
Variable FRQ BDS BIND FEB
Mean 1.649917 15.00000 0.543417 0.925000
Median 1.605000 15.00000 0.500000 0.500000
Maximum 1.980000 29.00000 0.810000 5.000000
Minimum 1.200000 10.00000 0.300000 0.000000
Std. dev. 0.175181 2.637799 0.100716 1.244568
Skewness 0.036165 1.500705 0.193278 1.508111
Kurtosis 2.189565 9.680739 2.988530 4.726197
Jarque-Bera 3.310187 268.2037 0.747783 60.38678
Probability 0.191074 0.000000 0.688051 0.000000
Sum 197.9900 1800.000 65.21000 111.0000
Sum Sq. Dev. 3.651899 828.0000 1.207099 184.3250
Observations 120 120 120 120
Table 2. Correlation matrix
Source: Authors’ computation (2017) using Eview 8.0.
Variable FRQ BDS BIND FEB
FRQ 1.000000 0.035280 0.058552 0.251659
BDS 0.035280 1.000000 0.055987 0.074232
BIND 0.058552 0.055987 1.000000 –0.053582
FEB 0.251659 0.074232 –0.053582 1.000000
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix of the in-
dependent and dependent variables for the study. 
It basically reflects the relative strength of the 
linear relationship between the explanatory vari-
ables. According to Gujarati (2004), multicolline-
arity could only be a problem if the pair-wise cor-
relation coefficient among regressors is above 0.80. 
However, results from the correlation matrix ta-
ble show that foreign expatriate on board (FEB) is 
strong and positively correlated with quality of fi-
nancial reports (FRQ). On the other hand, the out-
come for board independence (BIND) and board 
size (BDS) show a positive correlation with quali-
ty of financial reports (FRQ). Therefore, based on 
this outcome, the problem of multicollinearity is 
absent among the independent variables.
18
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Table 3. Hausman test
Source: Authors’ computation (2017) using Eview 8.0.
Correlated Random Effects – Hausman Test
Test cross-section random effects”**
Test summary Chi-sq. statistic
Chi-sq. 
d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 2.557057 3 0.4651
Note: ** mean significant at 5%.
Interpretation
The Hausman test was carried out to determine 
which model is appropriate for the panel regres-
sion. The Hausman test rule is as follows:
If the P-value is statistically significant, accept the 
alternative hypothesis (Fixed Effect Model).
If the P-value is not statistically significant, accept 
the null hypothesis (Random Effect Model).
However, analysis of the findings shows that the 
P-value (0.4651) > 5% significance level, so the null 
hypothesis is accepted and the alternative hypothe-
sis is accepted, which interprets that a random effect 
model should be used for the regression analysis.
4. DISCUSSION OF PANEL 
REGRESSION RESULTS
Deciding between the random effects (RE) mod-
el or fixed effects (FE) model as the suitable mod-
el for the study hinges on whether the individual 
effect was random or fixed. After comparing the 
fixed-effects with random-effects results using the 
Hausman test, the findings, as depicted in Table 3, 
show random-effects estimates of p < 0.05. Hence, 
the null hypothesis is accepted. While the fixed-
effects model is rejected. More so, since the p-val-
ue of Chi-square (0.4651) as shown in Table 3 is 
greater than 0.05, findings from this study will 
be discussed with respect to the random effects 
output shown in Table 3. Therefore, based on the 
random-effects regression estimate results are de-
picted in Table 3. With respect to the R-squared, 
the independent variables jointly explained 29 
percent of the variations in the dependent variable. 
Consequently, the adjusted R-squared shows that 
the independent variables have a 23% explaining 
power of the dependent variable. Similarly, results 
from the Fisher’s ratio displayed in Table 4 shows 
a p-value less than 0.05 (i.e. 0.000016 < 0.05); this 
result suggests that the association between the 
explanatory variables and the dependent varia-
ble is linear. Also, it suggests that the independ-
ent variables together are significantly related with 
the dependent variable. The Durbin-Watson is 
1.100122, which falls within the acceptable region 
and shows the presence of low auto-serial corre-
lation which is common in time series data. This 
confirms the statistical reliability of the model. 
Therefore, the model shows that there exists a sig-
nificant link between corporate governance and 
quality of financial reporting in Nigeria.
Findings for the first hypothesis which states that 
board size does not significantly affect the quality 
of financial reports as depicted in Table 4 show a 
Table 4. Regression result for panel data
Source: Authors’ computation (2017).
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic Prob.
FEB 0.029520 0.011455 2.577143 0.0113
BIND 0.041029 0.142064 0.288808 0.7733
BDS –0.003325 0.005562 –0.597833 0.5512
C 1.650190 0.112255 14.70032 0.0000
Effects specification (Period fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.299323 Mean dependent variable 1.649917
Adjusted R-squared 0.235040 S.D. dependent variable 0.175181
S.E. of regression 0.153216 Akaike info criterion –0.826742
Sum of squared residuals 2.558803 Schwarz criterion –0.571222
Log likelihood 60.60451 Hannan-Quinn criterion –0.722974
F-statistic 4.656377 Durbin-Watson statistic 1.100122
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000016 – –
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non-significant but negative association between 
board size and the quality of financial reports of 
the appraised banks. This outcome is evident in 
the t-values and p-values (C-coef = –0.003325; 
p = 0.5512 > 0.05), respectively. This result 
suggests that a unit upsurge in the board size will 
invariably lead to a –0.003325 unit of reduction 
in the quality of financial reports of the sampled 
banks. This means that an upsurge in the board 
size gives room for ineffectiveness of the oversight 
function of the board in ensuring the timeliness 
and quality of financial reporting. This outcome 
corroborates the findings of Bradbury, Mak, and 
Tan (2006), Abdul-Raman and Muhammed-Ali 
(2006) and Ahmed, Hosain, and Adams (2006), 
where a similar result was observed. However, it 
contradicts the findings of Yu (2008) and Byard, 
Li, and Weintrop (2006) who found a positive 
relationship.
Also, results for the second hypothesis (which 
states that board independence does not signif-
icantly affect the quality of financial reports) as 
depicted in Table 4 show that board independ-
ence has a non-significant positive influence on 
the quality of financial reports of banks in Nigeria. 
This is evident in the t-values and p-values 
(C-coef = 0.041029; p = 0.7733 > 0.05). Hence, the 
null hypothesis which states that board independ-
ence does not significantly affect the quality of fi-
nancial reports is accepted. This outcome implies 
that a unit increase in board independence induc-
es a 0.041029 unit improvement in the quality of 
financial reports of the sampled banks. This could 
mean that the more independent the board is, the 
more likely it is to improve and encourage timely 
and quality financial reporting. This could be cen-
tred on the fact that an independent director is one 
that is free from the control of the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO). This outcome is in line with the 
findings by Petra (2007), Gulzar and Wang (2011), 
however, they contradict the findings of Kantudu 
and Samaila (2015) and Joseph and Ahmed (2017).
Similarly, findings on the third hypothesis 
(Foreign executives on board do not significantly 
affect the quality of financial reports) as depicted 
in Table 4 show a significant positive link between 
foreign executives on board and the quality of fi-
nancial reports published by the appraised banks 
in Nigeria. This is depicted in the t-values and 
p-values (C-coef = 0.029520; p = 0.0113 < 0.05). 
Hence, the null hypothesis is rejected. This out-
come basically suggests that the incidence of for-
eign executives on the board significantly impacts 
the timeliness of financial statements. This result 
implies that an additional foreign executive add-
ed to the board will induce a 0.029520 increase in 
the quality of financial reports. This outcome is in 
consonance with the findings of Park and Shim 
(2015), however, the outcome contradicts the find-
ings of Bedrad, Chotorou, and Courteau (2003) 
and Abdul and Mohamhed (2006).
Table 5. Analysis of null hypotheses
Null hypotheses Accept Reject
H01: Board size does not 
significantly affect the quality of 
financial reports
˅ –
H02: Board independence does 
not significantly affect the quality 
of financial reports
˅ –
H03: Foreign executives on 
board do not significantly affect 
the quality of financial reports
– ˅
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This paper examined the influence of corporate governance on the quality of financial reports in Nigeria. 
The governance mechanisms used in this study include board size, board independence and the pres-
ence of foreign executives on the board. From the analysis above, it was observed that corporate govern-
ance apparently has a significant influence on the timeliness of financial reports. The study concludes 
that larger boards become more incompetent, because they tend to aggravate poor decision making and 
slow down the decision-making process. Furthermore, the study concludes that the inclusion of non-ex-
ecutive directors tend to offer an unbiased contribution to the board as they are perceived as reliable 
mechanisms to moderate agency conflicts between shareholders and managers. Finally, the study con-
cludes that the presence of foreign executives on the board will improve the quality of financial state-
ments of listed banks in Nigeria as they tend to provide their expertise and diversity in experience to the 
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board. This, in turn, will improve the financial reporting process and ultimately improving the timeli-
ness of financial reports among listed banks in Nigeria. The study, however, recommends that the num-
ber of directors on the board should be of a reasonable size. Also, in order to guarantee timely financial 
reports, large and overcrowded boards should be discouraged in Nigerian listed banks. This will foster 
faster communication, coordination and ultimately timely publishing of financial reports. In addition, 
the study recommends that the presence of foreign executives on the board should be encouraged as 
they tend to provide more financial expertise knowledge to the board on financial reporting issues.
LIMITATION AND SUGGESTION FOR FUTURE STUDY
This study is limited to only three corporate governance variables which are board size, board inde-
pendence, and FEB. However, other variables like Directors tenure can be taken into consideration in 
future research. Also, further research can be done on other fractions of the Nigerian economy such as 
the manufacturing sector.
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